An Introduction to Ucore Rare Metals

Deven

New member
Game-Changing Critical Mineral Technology in the World's 'Return to Matter'

In late December the internet began lighting up with the circulation of a profound article on Substack by Craig Tindale called “The Return of Matter: Western Democracies' material impairment”. [*] The article is the subject of significant attention and it undoubtably has been reviewed by government policy makers and strategic planners in a variety of industries and major corporations. The article—which should be required reading—persuasively describes the state of US disinvestment and abdication, and Chinese ascendancy and domination, in the realm of Rare Earths and Critical Minerals.

Tucked somewhat discretely within the article’s “Solutions and Conclusions” section is mention of two game-changing technologies which Tindale suggests could play a part in the West’s efforts to swiftly identify and progress solutions to its present ‘intolerable’ situation:
  • RapidSX from Ucore Rare Metals (OTCQX: UURAF or TSXV:UCU), https://ucore.com
  • Flash Joule Heating (FJH) from Metallium Limited (formerly MTM Metals) (OTCQX: MTMCF or OTCQX ADR: MTLMY or ASX: MTM), https://metalliuminc.com
My intention below is to provide a high-level description of these technologies and a brief introduction to the two companies which own them. The objective is to supply readers with an idea of the technologies’ relevance within the US’ effort to begin to free itself from its present dependency on the outsourcing of midstream processing of Rare Earths and other Critical Minerals.

Before discussing the technologies, however, here is some brief context as to why these technologies are important, and why their relevance will increase over the coming months.

By 2024 China dominated global rare-earth production supplying 70% of mine output and nearly 90% of all processing capacity. The US over the same period had a reliance of over 80% on rare-earth imports. [*] [*] In 2025, in reaction to the Trump administration’s hard-ball trade negotiating tactics, the Chinese revealed their upper hand and began announcing and implementing new regulations to restrict or cut off many of these essential mineral inputs to entities outside of China. [*] [*]

The impact of this, of course, is exceedingly wide-ranging, affecting the US’ ability to function and advance within a multitude of areas such as consumer electronics, medical devices, AI, semiconductors, datacenters, energy infrastructure, robotics, advanced batteries, electric vehicles, aerospace, and most-ominously, defense systems.

In November 2025, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced a "warp speed" effort over the next 12 to 24 months to eliminate the United States' dependence on China for critical rare earth materials, referring to China's supply control as a "stranglehold" and a "sword" over the world. [*]

For the West, however, there are massive capital requirements, stringent environmental regulations, prohibitive development timelines, and a decayed knowledge and skill environment which present formidable or impossible barriers to deploying adequate solutions outside of China in the next several years.

As is widely recognized now, and which Tindale skillfully elaborates upon, the problem is not primarily in the acquisition of indispensable raw material input feedstocks, but in the processing and refining of them for consequent use in much of our modern world. Immediate solutions are needed relative to standing up processing and refining capability outside of China’s control, and in the US there are just a few players which have meaningful capability and capacity to contribute (and even fewer which are publicly traded).

It took China decades to secure and scale rare earth mining and processing. Expecting to replicate any substantial portion of this capacity using traditional approaches in the US would be fanciful. The crisis will need to be addressed by employing innovative and revolutionary technologies which change existing paradigms and open up new possibilities for feedstock and the economics of production. New solutions will need to be able to exploit already existing but until now under- or un-utilized sources such as industrial and electronic waste. Facilities, equipment, permits, processes, human resources, logistics, funding, etcetera will need to be able to come into place in a matter of months rather than years.

Appropriate solutions will need to:
  • Be capable of relatively rapid deployment
  • Provide modularity and scalability
  • Occupy reduced physical footprints
  • Be flexible and feedstock-agnostic
  • Be far more efficient and produce faster throughput
  • Produce accelerated separations and higher yields
  • Require lower energy and water consumption
  • Require fewer inputs and inventories
  • Reduce acids and reagent usage and waste byproducts
  • Be more environmentally compatible
  • Be constituted of non-restricted equipment and processes
  • Have lower CapEx and OpEx requirements
  • Demonstrate attractive and durable economics
I propose to you that the two companies, Ucore and Metallium, may be capable of accomplishing these objectives and meaningfully contributing to mitigating the severe vulnerabilities which presently endanger the world’s defense systems, tech economies, political autonomy, and the progression of modern life itself.

These companies bring to bear innovative new solutions which are superior to current legacy approaches, and which conceivably represent some of the most rapid paths to addressing the crisis in the near-term, and to diminishing China’s advantages and dominance in the long-run. Both of the technologies they offer represent revolutionary approaches with numerous significant advantages and compelling reasons for adoption. Both of these companies appear to be on the cusp of addressing governmental policy objectives, deploying their solutions within the market, impressing industry partners, and receiving greater investor attention and backing.
 
Ucore Rare Metals

https://ucore.com



Description and Mission:
  • Ucore is a midstream Rare Earth Element developer. Its core business lies in taking mixed rare earth carbonates as feedstock and separating them into rare earth oxides. The Company’s strategy is centered on establishing US-based rare earth processing infrastructure using feedstock sourced from non-China jurisdictions. [*]
  • “Ucore is focused on rare and critical metal resources, extraction, beneficiation, and separation technologies... Ucore’s vision and plan is to be a leading advanced technology company, providing best-in-class metal separation products and services to the mining and mineral extraction industry.” [*]
  • Ucore has US Defense Priorities & Allocations System (“DPAS”) status, which prioritizes DPAS-rated orders over all others in order to meet national defense and emergency preparedness requirements. [*]

Technology: RapidSX™
  • RapidSX is essentially a much-improved form of solvent extraction (a standard method for refining rare earths) but redesigned for speed and efficiency. Instead of large complexes of slow, solvent-filled settling tanks, Ucore’s system uses computerized columns and an array of sensors to drastically accelerate the separation process. Independent tests indicate RapidSX can separate rare earth elements (depending on feedstock) three to ten times faster than traditional methods, while using a plant footprint about one-third the size of a typical refinery. [*] [*]
  • RapidSX features simplified flowsheets and significantly accelerated separation timelines compared to conventional solvent extraction which supports faster domestic deployment. It is feedstock-agnostic for both light and heavy rare earths, and entails a modular, repeatable system architecture designed for rapid scaling as demand and policy frameworks evolve. [*] [*]
  • On November 27, 2025, CEO Pat Ryan indicated to BNN Bloomberg that the commissioning of their first commercial RapidSX machine (deploying at their Strategic Metals Complex in Louisiana, USA), will occur by mid-2026, and by the end of the year there will be two or three RapidSX machines running. Because of the scalable, modular nature of Ucore’s technology they expect to get to revenue in 2026, and after three years, the 10,000 TREO plant will have “a $1B top-line revenue with a very good return.” (minute 6:33) [*]

Plants / Assets:
  • Alexandria, Louisiana, USA, Strategic Metals Complex (SMC) & HREE Refinery
    • An 80,800-square-foot brownfield facility on a 10.7+ acre (former U.S. Air Force) industrial parcel, billed as one of the most advanced rare earth downstream separation facilities in North America. [*]
    • Advantageously located within a federally designated Foreign Trade Zone, this designation allows Ucore to benefit from the potential deferral, reduction, or elimination of duties (tariffs, taxes, fees) on imported feedstock, which reduces expenses and increases their operational competitiveness.
  • Kingston, Ontario, CAN, Commercialization and Demonstration Facility (CDF)
    • A 52-Stage RapidSX™ Demonstration Plant which has been operated and continuously improved since 2023 [*]
  • Bokan-Dotson Rare Earth Element Project, Ketchikan, Alaska, one of the highest-grade HREE resource in the US. [*]

Partnerships / Feedstock / Offtake:
  • Wyloo Gascoyne Pty Ltd and Hastings Technology Metals Ltd - to establish a long-term supply path for Yangibana rare earth concentrate feedstock. [*]
  • Critical Metals Corp - for heavy rare earth element feedstock from CRML’s Tanbreez Project in southern Greenland. [*]
  • Cyclic Materials - for the future supply of recycled mixed rare earth oxide. [*]
  • Meteoric Resources NL - for the supply of total rare earth oxide from their forthcoming Caldeira Rare Earth Ionic Clay Project in Brazil. [*]
  • ABx Group of Australia - for mixed rare earth carbonates from its Deep Leads ionic adsorption clay rare earths resource in Northern Tasmania. [*]
  • Thyssenkrupp - for long-term supply of Mixed Rare Earth Carbonate feedstock. [*]
  • Defense Metals Corp - for testing and potentially processing Defense Metals' Wicheeda project feedstock. [*]
  • Vacuumschmelze GmbH (“VAC Group”) and eVAC Magnetics LLC - for offtake to its rare earth permanent magnet manufacturing facility in Sumter County, South Carolina. [*]
  • Metallium Limited - in a strategic partnership to perform Flash Joule Heating (FJH) for upgrading rare earth mineral concentrates to Mixed Rare Earth Chlorides, which will then be refined into purified rare earth oxides utilizing Ucore’s RapidSX technology at its Louisiana SMC refinery. [*]
  • Additional offtake discussions are indicated to be underway with consumer electronics, permanent magnet manufacturing, defense contractor, and automotive EV companies. [*]

Government Support:
  • USD $22.4 million U.S. Department of War, “Other Transaction Agreement” through the U.S. Army Contracting Command. The Phase 1 Award for $4M supported a demonstration program to show the efficacy of the company’s RapidSX proprietary processing for unlocking the four primary rare earths required to produce high-performance permanent magnets. The Phase 2 Award for $18.4M will facilitate the construction of Ucore’s commercial scale RapidSX machine at their Louisiana rare earth refining complex. [*] [*]
  • Conditional approval of up to $26.3 million from Natural Resources Canada’s (NRCan), through its Global Partnerships Initiative (GPI) Program [*]
  • $4.28 million in funding from NRCan’s Critical Minerals Research, Development and Demonstration Program (“CMRDD”) [*]
  • Up to $10 million from FedDev Ontario, to demonstrate and scale-up a commercial processing facility in Kingston, Ontario, dedicated to the refining of the critical rare earth elements samarium and gadolinium. [*]
 
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Hi @Deven

There’s been a lot of discussion lately about RapidSX and whether it represents a breakthrough that could materially weaken China’s dominance in rare earth separation. It’s an interesting technology — faster solvent extraction, smaller footprint, more modular design — but it’s important to keep the broader context in mind.

China doesn’t need RapidSX specifically because they already operate highly optimised solvent extraction systems at enormous industrial scale. Decades of process refinement, proprietary solvents, operational know how and full supply-chain integration (mine → separation → metals → magnets) give them an advantage that isn’t simply about extraction speed.

RapidSX will def help new ex-China projects reduce capital intensity — which is valuable — but it doesn’t suddenly leapfrog China’s processing capability. The real competitive gap remains their processing system depth, engineering expertise, downstream integration, and scale economics.

And from what I understand, Ucore are still at the pilot/demonstration stage....so they have not yet shown this will work at scale. I believe they are working on a their first commercial commisioning around June 2026...at around 2000 tpa of TREO (and potential to scale much higher in a year or two).

Also - soemthing to be mindful of, is that RapidSX does not remove the radiation. It just seperates the rare earths. So if someone is sending their product to Ucore, they will have to have done their radiological management (cracking / leaching stage) before using RapidSX (solvent extraction). And that is where alot of the permit issues happen that delays projects by decades. So it is really just the last part of the 'processing process' where RapidSX should save time/capital/footprint etc..(note they might still have some radiation as well to contend with).

That being said, from an investor perspective, this is where their company valuation should sky rocket, if they can get thier Rapid SX working at scale.

2026 is going to be an interesting year for Rare Earths.

Don't forget also....1 Jan 2027.....when all US Military is to have zero Chinese magnets. Good luck with that!
 
Hi John,

Great points. I agree China’s advantages are formidable to insurmountable. I haven’t evaluated RapidSX based on whether China will need it or adopt similar approaches. China’s starting position is obviously much different than the West’s, and thus each has different levels of sunk capital, current capacity, know-how, commercial momentum, financing capability, etcetera which influence the relative value of alternatives for each. I think about the West starting from basically zero, and needing solutions of a different character. Solutions need to be ‘better’ than China solutions in numerous aspects so that they can attempt to compete with the advantages which China will continue to possess and exploit. They need to facilitate progression from ‘non-existence’ to ‘competitive-alternatives’ in a rapid timeframe and under generally more regulated business environments. So I’m not so much thinking of it as ‘what is the most effective existing or theoretical way to process’, but what are the solutions most likely to be capable, economic, and preferred over the next two years. They may be ‘partial’ solutions which nonetheless still participate and enjoy significant success. I would guess there will be multiple participants, approaches, and successful survivors.

Relative to scaling … their Canadian Commercial Demonstration Facility (“CDF”) Plant has been operating since late 2023 with 4000+ hours of data under evaluation. They also received conditional approval for funding from Government of Canada, to scale up a commercial processing facility in Kingston, Ontario.

They received a U.S. Department of War Phase 2 Award to facilitate the construction of the commercial scale RapidSX machine at the Louisiana facility. I’m not sure if this is the most recent update, but previously they have said Ucore’s initial production of REO in Louisiana was forecast to start commissioning by Q4-2025 and commence commercial operations in the first half of 2026.

Lots of unknowns coming though as Trump is likely to tout his March trade deal and meeting with XI as “completely and totally” solving everything, and there no longer being any RE problems. Whatever the messaging on it, I think it is safe to assume that China will continue to use their scale and control to advantage themselves and impede all competitors and political/military adversaries.

(The Chinese one-year suspension on the October 2025 restrictions will be expiring also, unless addressed in the pending trade deal.)

Cheers
 
I think it was @ashentegra that put me onto the book "The Big L - Amercian Logistics in WW2" - It showed how USA and the west prepared for the war. I have a copy.

Here is a quick ChatGPT that shows the historical parallel. And shows what might happen as well. Nothing is ever really new.....

From ChatGPT:

WWII Commodity Security vs Today’s Rare Earth Challenge — A Historical Parallel
There’s a useful historical lens when thinking about rare earths and critical minerals today: what the United States did before WWII to secure strategic commodities. The parallels are surprisingly strong — especially around processing capacity, allied supply chains, and government industrial policy.

Below is a simplified comparison.

WWII Commodity Preparation vs Today’s Critical Minerals Strategy​

Pre-WWII U.S. ActionStrategic PurposeRare Earth / Critical Minerals Parallel TodayCurrent Reality
Strategic stockpiling of rubber, tin, chromium, tungsten, etc.Insurance against supply disruptionStockpiles of NdPr, Dy, Tb, lithium, graphite, cobaltWestern stockpiles growing but still modest vs China
Domestic mining expansionReduce reliance on importsIncentives for rare earth mining in US, Australia, CanadaMining advancing but permitting slow
Massive refining/metallurgy build-outProcessing seen as decisive advantageSeparation plants, metal/alloy capacity, magnet plantsBiggest bottleneck outside China
Synthetic rubber developmentSubstitute vulnerable importsRecycling, substitution tech, new processing approachesHelpful but not primary supply solution
Securing allied supply chainsFriend-shoring critical inputsAustralia, Canada, Africa partnerships, EU critical minerals policyIncreasingly formalized via government agreements
Price supports/subsidiesKeep strategic mines viableOfftake guarantees, defense funding, financing supportEmerging but not fully scaled
Industrial overcapacity creationSurge wartime productionMagnet manufacturing build-out outside ChinaStill heavily China-dominant
Pre-war industrial planningCoordinated mobilization readinessCritical minerals strategies, supply chain mappingMore fragmented than WWII era
Domestic energy dominance (oil)Military logistics advantageBattery metals and electrification supply chainsChina dominant in refining
Agricultural surplusSustained wartime resilienceRecycling/circular economy effortsGrowing but insufficient alone

Key Takeaways​

Processing capacity matters more than mining.
- This was true for aluminium and alloys in WWII — and it’s true for rare earths today.
Stockpiling typically happens before crisis peaks.
- We’re likely still early in that cycle.
Allied supply chains are critical.
- Friend-shoring isn’t new — it’s historically proven.
Technology helps but doesn’t replace primary supply.
- Synthetic rubber then ≈ recycling/substitution now.
Government policy shapes commodity security.
- Markets alone rarely build strategic supply chains fast enough. They need Government intervention.

Bottom Line​

If history rhymes, the West is still in the early mobilization phase for critical minerals. Mining progress is visible, but processing, magnets, and coordinated industrial policy remain the decisive gaps.
Understanding that trajectory is key for anyone watching the rare earth sector.



What do you guys think?
 
So.....IMHO....the only way the west can stop its reliance on China...is for Govt to spend spend spend.

And the number is really not that big in the scheme of the US/Global Economies.....maybe 10-20 Billion. Mabye some some.....but the security it will give the west.....priceless....
 
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