ARU - Short Discussion

[John]

So the following is just me trying out my programing skills. So there are sure to be some mistakes. But it looks ok so far.

So here is what I could scrape:




So that is the Data.

Here are the graphs:





o what does it all mean? Here’s the story that emerges from this dataset:



1. Early Period (Late Jan to Early Feb)

• Price Range: ~0.125 → 0.145
• Short Interest: rising steadily from ~92M to ~95M shares.
• % Issued Shorted: ~3.7–3.8% → moderately high.
• Volume Spikes: occasional high-volume days, with Days-to-Cover (DtC) often >20–50, meaning liquidity was thin relative to the short position.
• Story: Shorts were adding slowly, but the price didn’t collapse. It oscillated within a tight band, suggesting either controlled selling pressure or accumulation from long buyers absorbing supply.

2. Mid-February – Volatility Phase

• Feb 6–14: Price tested 0.14–0.15, volumes spiked to 4M+, short interest jumped, but DtC fell as liquidity improved.
• There’s a sharp drop on Feb 19 (~-7% intraday), but it bounced back by Feb 21.
• Narrative: Shorts likely tried to push the price lower, but strong buying supported the stock around 0.14.

3. Late Feb – Sudden RALLY

• Feb 25–27: Price explodes from 0.15 → 0.175–0.185, and volume surges >15M.
• Shorts covered: net reduction in shorts, dropping from ~95M → ~91M.
• Days-to-Cover plummeted (showing massive liquidity).
• Story: Likely news-driven spike or a short squeeze. Shorts were forced to cover as volume/liquidity surged.

4. Early March – Profit Taking

• After peaking ~0.185, the stock retraced to ~0.16–0.17.
• Shorts rebuilt positions, climbing again toward ~94M shares.
• Volume dropped back to 3–5M daily, meaning buying pressure cooled.
• Narrative: Post-news hangover. Traders locked in gains. Shorts took advantage of fading momentum.

5. Late March – MAJOR EVENT

• March 20: Volume explodes to 23M+, price pushes to 0.20+, but short interest collapses by ~50% overnight (from ~97M → ~48M).
• Days-to-Cover drops from ~4.1 → 0.6.
• Narrative: MASSIVE short covering day → likely a big catalyst (deal? announcement?) forcing shorts to flee.

6. April–May – Consolidation

• After the big squeeze:
  • Shorts stabilize ~50M (only ~2.2% of issued shares).
  • Price grinds between 0.18–0.20.
  • Volume normalizes, moderate swings but no breakout.
• Narrative: Market digests the news. Shorts are cautious. No new catalyst yet.

7. June – Rebuild Phase

• Shorts start creeping back up (~55M by end of June).
• Price stays range-bound 0.16–0.18, suggesting accumulation or quiet selling.
• Narrative: The market has cooled; traders are waiting for the next trigger.

8. July – Second Leg Up

• July 4–21:Price surges again:
  • 0.18 → 0.23–0.24.
  • Volume rises again (10–15M).
  • Shorts drop further (~53M → ~50M → ~49M).
• Narrative: Another bullish wave, possibly second news catalyst → shorts exit gradually.

Overall Storyline

1. Jan–Feb: Steady short build, controlled selling.
2. Late Feb: Short squeeze & spike (~0.15 → 0.18+).
3. March: Sharp event-driven squeeze (volume 20M+, shorts halve overnight).
4. Apr–May: Sideways consolidation, shorts cautious.
5. June: Shorts quietly rebuild, price compresses.
6. July: Second breakout toward 0.24 with shorts exiting.

Likely Interpretation

• This looks like where shorts try to suppress the price between catalysts.
• Each news/catalyst triggers massive volume, forcing shorts to cover.
• There’s a cyclical patternof:
  • Shorts build → price stagnates
  • Catalyst arrives → spike → shorts cover → consolidation → repeat.

What do you guys think? Seems about right...

 

[Durro]

It’s my hope that when FID is finally announced, the shorters will get severely burned.

 

[WideMouthFrog]

Lots to discuss here;

The major thing, it’s not as cut and dry. And with ARU, this serious manipulation has happened about 4-5 times that I recall. It’s market manipulation at its finest. Additionally, it’s not isolated to ARU. It’s repeated many times over and ASIC turn a blind eye.

Let’s use one example that you have noted in March of 2025. This also happened many other times. But for illustration purposes let’s use that date.

Here is the Rort! And it’s way larger than just a short or short covering.


The Feedback Loop: Shorting → Index Exit → Forced Selling → Short Cover

Here’s how it can unfold:

• Shorts target a vulnerable company, or a start up looking to grow, or in a vulnerable industry, driving down price through sustained selling, negative sentiment, or even activist reports.
• Index rules kick in: If the company’s market cap or liquidity drops below thresholds, it’s booted from the index.
• Passive funds must sell: ETFs and index trackers are forced to dump shares to stay compliant.
• Extra supply floods the market, often at depressed prices — perfect for shorts to cover without spiking the price.
• Shorts exit profitably, having engineered both the decline and the liquidity event.


It’s not just opportunistic — it’s structurally enabled.

Why is this allowed?

Because each step, in isolation, is technically legal:

• Short selling is permitted under ASIC rules, with disclosure and borrowing requirements.
• Index rebalancing is mechanical — no discretion, no malice.
• Forced selling by funds is a compliance necessity, not manipulation.
• Covering shorts is just closing a position.


But when stitched together, it can resemble intentional market manipulation — especially if there’s coordination, timing, or misleading conduct involved.

Importantly, I proved it in more than 10 companies on one day. Not a coincidence but a scheme. ‘Scheme of short rebalancing’.

All retail investors have a financial loss.


What does the law say?

Under Section 1041A of the Corporations Act, market manipulation is illegal if someone creates or maintains an artificial price. But proving intent — that the shorting was done specifically to trigger index exclusion and forced selling — is notoriously difficult.

ASIC has taken action in cases where manipulation was more overt (e.g. spoofing, wash trades, false statements). But this kind of structural exploitation often slips through the cracks.

So what’s the fix?

Some argue for:

• Stricter short disclosure: Real-time transparency on large positions.
• Index rule reform: Smoother transitions or discretionary overrides to prevent forced selling cascades.
• Market integrity reviews: ASIC could investigate patterns where shorting aligns suspiciously with index exits.

Note; the shorters under the banner of capital raises have also rorted Retail shareholders with capital raises.

Additionally, I noted this occurred across many companies on the ASX on the exact same day using this scam! I reported to ASIC three times, and no action has been taken.

An unregulated regulator…

 

[John]

It’s my hope that when FID is finally announced, the shorters will get severely burned.

They seem to always have a way out. Usually through the raises. Should be illegal.

 

[John]

Lots to discuss here;

The major thing, it’s not as cut and dry as per your outline. And with ARU, this has happened about 4-5 times that I recall. It’s market manipulation at its finest. Additionally, it’s not isolated to ARU. It’s repeated many times over and ASIC turn a blind eye.

Let’s use one example that you have noted in March of 2025. This also happened many other times. But for illustration purposes let’s use that date.

Here is the Rort! And it’s way larger than just a short or short covering.


The Feedback Loop: Shorting → Index Exit → Forced Selling → Short Cover

Here’s how it can unfold:

• Shorts target a vulnerable company, or a start up looking to grow, or in a vulnerable industry, driving down price through sustained selling, negative sentiment, or even activist reports.
• Index rules kick in: If the company’s market cap or liquidity drops below thresholds, it’s booted from the index.
• Passive funds must sell: ETFs and index trackers are forced to dump shares to stay compliant.
• Extra supply floods the market, often at depressed prices — perfect for shorts to cover without spiking the price.
• Shorts exit profitably, having engineered both the decline and the liquidity event.


It’s not just opportunistic — it’s structurally enabled.

Why is this allowed?

Because each step, in isolation, is technically legal:

• Short selling is permitted under ASIC rules, with disclosure and borrowing requirements.
• Index rebalancing is mechanical — no discretion, no malice.
• Forced selling by funds is a compliance necessity, not manipulation.
• Covering shorts is just closing a position.


But when stitched together, it can resemble intentional market manipulation — especially if there’s coordination, timing, or misleading conduct involved.

Importantly, I proved it in more than 10 companies on one day. Not a coincidence but a scheme. ‘Scheme of short rebalancing’.

All retail investors have a financial loss.


What does the law say?

Under Section 1041A of the Corporations Act, market manipulation is illegal if someone creates or maintains an artificial price. But proving intent — that the shorting was done specifically to trigger index exclusion and forced selling — is notoriously difficult.

ASIC has taken action in cases where manipulation was more overt (e.g. spoofing, wash trades, false statements). But this kind of structural exploitation often slips through the cracks.

So what’s the fix?

Some argue for:

• Stricter short disclosure: Real-time transparency on large positions.
• Index rule reform: Smoother transitions or discretionary overrides to prevent forced selling cascades.
• Market integrity reviews: ASIC could investigate patterns where shorting aligns suspiciously with index exits.

Note; the shorters under the banner of capital raises have also rorted Retail shareholders with capital raises.

Additionally, I noted this occurred across many companies on the ASX on the exact same day using this scam! I reported to ASIC three times, and no action has been taken.

An unregulated regulator…

I’m going to come Back to this. I have some fixes as well. Very simple stuff.

 

[WideMouthFrog]

Additionally, I would like to point out the cost to retail investors.

As an example, the shorters, have been for want of a better word gifted these 60m shares off market. All while I know retail investors that were asking to buy more shares in these capital raises. Brings into question not on the role of ASIC but also directors.

In a fair world they would have to buy these on market.

This happened five times.

So that’s circa 5x 50million shares = 250million shares.

If shorters had to buy 250million shares, what would the price of ARU share be today?

What value would you give this? 10-20c plus momentum.

So how does this reflect with regard to dilution on upcoming capital raise.

It’s so wrong, in many ways. It’s known and it’s not regulated.

Non regulation has in this case, and I know many other companies on the ASX significant financial losses.

Worse, has potentially sunk companies into administration.

What’s the real cost?

 

[WideMouthFrog]

They seem to always have a way out. Usually through the raises. Should be illegal.

The index rebalance is the proven way out, and the capital raises are the icing on the cake.

If you have a look at every company that was exited from the index. They all just coincidently had large drop in shorts the next day…to support their exit.

Oddly, it was the shorters that forced them out of the index in the first place.

A coordinated scheme.