Talking about Joint Ventures.
The below was posted on ARU Hotcopper from a Senior Korean defence journalist .
The most Interesting Part of the Article was the 3rd last paragraph stating the below .
While the world is alarmed and domestic industries are worried, Korea’s government appears to be watching from the sidelines. Authorities have increased stockpiles, strengthened international cooperation and supported technologies for reduction, substitution and recycling. But this is not enough. Securing overseas rare-earth mines is essential.
Is there any possibility of a Korean JV that could be a win/win that the Australian Government would be happy with too ?
A Korean owned mines alone would NOT be good enough , as they really require processed product from an owned mine .
How long can Korea rely on the private sector for strategic rare earth supplies?
Published: 07 Aug. 2025, 00:03
Lee Cheol-jae
The author is a senior defense reporter at the JoongAng Ilbo
A story recently emerged from a domestic auto parts company. The firm, which produces electric vehicle motors, has been exploring drones and even built a prototype quadcopter. When considering supplying the drone to the military, the company hesitated. The reason was the rare-earth magnets used in its motors.
The firm sources all of its rare-earth magnets from China. It worried that if Beijing learned that its magnets were being used in military drones, the supply could be cut off. This concern is not isolated. According to the Korea International Trade Association, 99.3 percent of Korea’s rare-earth magnets imported last year came from China.
The rivalry between the United States and China spans land, sea, air, cyberspace and outer space. Rare earth metals are now part of that contest. The Wall Street Journal reported on Aug. 3 that after China restricted rare-earth exports, military production slowed and Western defense firms scrambled to secure supply worldwide.
The tension escalated after the United States imposed 145 percent tariffs on Chinese products in April. In response, China tightened exports of critical minerals, including rare earths. Western factories faced shutdowns as supplies shrank. A temporary tariff truce in June allowed some exports to resume, but Beijing continues to strictly control minerals for defense use. The price of samarium, one of the key rare-earth elements, has surged 60-fold.
Rare earth elements consist of 17 metals: scandium, yttrium and the lanthanides from lanthanum through lutetium. Known for their fluorescent, conductive and magnetic properties, they are essential for displays, motors and batteries. If steel was the “rice of industry” in the 20th century, rare earths are the “vitamins of industry” in the 21st.
Despite the name, rare earths are not scarce. They are dispersed in low concentrations and usually mixed with other minerals. Extracting small amounts requires processing large volumes of ore, generating considerable toxic waste.
The United States was once a rare-earth powerhouse. During the Cold War, it countered the Soviet Union’s numerical strength with precision-guided weapons. Samarium boosted radar performance, while yttrium improved laser target designators. The Mountain Pass mine in California’s Mojave Desert was the world’s largest source of rare earths.
China began developing rare earths strategically in the late 20th century. In his 1992 southern tour speech, Deng Xiaoping famously said, “The Middle East has oil; China has rare earths.” From 1978 to 1995, China’s rare-earth production increased by an average of 40 percent annually. Falling prices forced U.S. and Western producers to close mines or halt production, leaving China dominant due to lower costs and fewer environmental restrictions.
Beijing expanded its influence by acquiring overseas rare-earth mines and companies. A notable case was Magnequench, a U.S. producer of rare-earth magnets. Washington approved its 1995 acquisition by a Chinese consortium on the condition that operations remain in the United States for five years. The factory moved to China the day that period ended, cementing China’s control over the magnet market.
The risks became clear as two major events unfolded. The first was the launch of Apple’s iPhone on Jan. 9, 2007. Nine types of rare earths are embedded in the sleek device. Lanthanum corrects distortion in tiny glass camera lenses, neodymium magnets improve sound in small speakers and yttrium and erbium phosphors brighten displays while saving power.
The second was the Sept. 7, 2010, incident near the Senkaku Islands, when Japan’s coast guard detained a Chinese fishing captain. Soon after, China’s rare-earth exports to Japan slowed without explanation. Tokyo protested, but Beijing cited environmental measures. Prices soared, in some cases by several hundred percent. Japan eventually released the captain.
Today, rare-earth demand is surging, and China alternates between tightening and loosening supply at will. Rising U.S.-China tensions have made this volatility more severe. The U.S. Department of Defense is particularly exposed, as over 80,000 components in its systems rely on Chinese-sourced critical minerals.
In response, the Pentagon last month acquired a 15 percent stake in MP Materials, the largest rare-earth miner, which operates the Mountain Pass mine and a magnet plant. The Pentagon agreed to guarantee nearly double the market price for the company’s rare earths for the next decade.
Even so, breaking global dependence on Chinese rare earths will take time. Some analysts estimate at least 20 years. The United States invested in Australia’s Lynas in 2017, but progress has been limited. Japan diversified its supply chain after the 2010 shock, yet its reliance on China still stands at 70 percent, according to the Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security in 2024.
While the world is alarmed and domestic industries are worried, Korea’s government appears to be watching from the sidelines. Authorities have increased stockpiles, strengthened international cooperation and supported technologies for reduction, substitution and recycling. But this is not enough. Securing overseas rare-earth mines is essential.
The Korea Mine Rehabilitation and Mineral Resources Corporation, formed in 2021 by merging the Korea Resources Corporation and the Korea Mine Reclamation Corporation, is prohibited from conducting overseas resource development. The responsibility falls entirely to the private sector. Korea once secured Vietnam’s Dong Pao rare-earth mine in 1997 but lost it during the financial crisis.
Unless the country regains a proactive role in resource security, it risks remaining dependent on what one might call “rare-earth rain-fed paddies,” relying on others for lifeblood materials in the age of strategic minerals.
